The Long Shadow of the Past

History, Memory and the Debate over West Germany's Nuclear Status, 1954–69

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What is wrong with discrimination against her [Germany] in the use and possession of nuclear weapons?

Hugh Gaitskell, 1960[1]

Two decades after Auschwitz, two apparently unrelated questions simultaneously preoccupied West Germany and the Bundesrepublik's friends and foes alike: first, whether West Germany should maintain the option of possessing weapons of mass destruction; second, whether mass murderers of the Third Reich could come forward without risking prosecution. In the late 1950s, the mood of "collective silence" about the shared memory of the Nazi past during the immediate postwar era gradually gave way to a more open, self-critical discussion about the German past.[2] The beginning of a second phase of dealing with the Nazi past was marked most notably by the NS-trials and the acrimonious debates over the extension of the statute of limitations allowing to continue prosecution of war criminals in West Germany.[3] This second phase of the West German history of memory coincided with more than a decade of heated debate over West Germany's nuclear status.

In 1954 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer renounced the development of nuclear weapons within the Federal Republic as a precondition for West Germany's admission into NATO and German rearmament. The

late 1950s saw the high tide of the West German peace movement *Kampf dem Atomtod* protesting against the deployment of US nuclear forces on West German soil.[4]

political gains by using the mobilizing, politicizing, defaming or scandalizing effect of history.[9] Little work has yet been done on how *Geschichtspolitik* influenced the debates over nuclear weapons in German hands. This article aims to contribute toward the closure of these gaps in the existing historiography.

The purpose of the analysis is threefold. First, the article examines how history was used as a "weapon" in the nuclear debate of the 1950s and 1960s.[10] Second, it explores direct links between the politics of the past and nuclear issues: how did the statute of limitations debate, the NS-trials and the rise of the far-right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD) influence West German nuclear policy? Third, the article explores the international dimension: how was the nuclear policy of the US and Britain toward the Federal Republic influenced by their understanding of the German past? Bearing in mind the fragmented nature of history and memory, this article attempts to shed light on which German pasts served as reference points in the nuclear debate and what this could tell us about postwar understanding of recent German history in West Germany, Britain and the United States.

AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY: "NUCLEARIZATION" OF THE *BUNDESWEHR* AND EARLY NUCLEAR SHARING PLANS (1954–60)

In 1954 the Western allies, still fearful of a future resurgent Germany, demanded renunciation of nuclear weapons as a precondition for German rearmament and admission into NATO. The Federal Government only had to renounce the production of nuclear weapons on West German soil. The options of acquiring nuclear weapons or jointly producing an atomic bomb outside Germany were still open.[11] For a number of reasons, from the mid-1950s onwards, Bonn had a growing interest in reaffirming these options and in relaxing the 1954 provisions.[12] First, the threat of some form of West German nuclear capability was seen as a powerful diplomatic lever in negotiations with the Soviets over German reunification. In short, the mere possibility of a West German nuclear capability enhanced Adenauer's "policy of strength" toward Moscow. Second, the nuclear weapons programs of both Britain and France were seen as reinforcing West Germany's inferior status within NATO. Regaining sovereignty and

equality with Britain and France was a primary goal of Adenauer's *West-politik* and the desire for equality soon translated into demands for nuclear *Mitsprache* (a say in the control of nuclear weapons). Third, lack of influence over NATO nuclear strategy concerned the Germans because a future superpower confrontation was likely to turn Germany (East and West) into a nuclear battlefield over which the Germans would have no control. West German insecurity was intensified by the launch of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik* in 1957, which marked the end of US nuclear invulnerability. *Sputnik* nurtured German (and West European) doubts about the credibility of the American security guarantee for Europe. Under these changing circumstances, West Germany demanded a say in the nuclear defense of the alliance.

To reassure the Europeans in the aftermath of *Sputnik,* the Eisenhower administration offered the deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Europe and devised concepts to give the European allies more responsibility in the nuclear defense of Western Europe.[13] In addition, NATO plan MC-70 entailing a greater tactical nuclear build-up in Western Europe provided for the equipment of the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons systems. In March 1958 the Bundestag agreed to the deployment of these systems in West Germany. The missiles were covered by a dual-key system in which the US maintained custody of the nuclear warhead.[14] Thus the West German army was provided with nuclear weapons under ultimate control of the United States.[15] The prospect of nuclear weapons on West German soil sparked off the first major nuclear debate in West Germany. It increased the widespread resentment against German rearmament and led thousands of Germans to protest against nuclear weapons.

Plans for a "nuclearization" of the newly established Bundeswehr refueled the heated debate about Germans in arms that had begun with West German rearmament less than a decade after the end of World War II. Rearmament, NATO membership and deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany were regarded as steadily diminishing the chances for German reunification. Thus, the protest of the late 1950s against nuclear weapons was the culmination of a wider debate over Adenauer's course of Western integration. However, in all sections of the political spectrum opposition against rearmament was also closely linked to the immediate past.[16] For some, rejection of rearmament reflected the feeling that German

"military honor and integrity had been besmirched" and that the new army would be un-German and commanded by the occupying forces.[17] For others it rekindled fears of the emergence of another mighty reactionary German army—another state within the state.[18] The decision to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons recalled traumas and memories of the devastation of two world wars—inside and outside Germany.

The anti-nuclear campaign of 1958–60 was inexorably linked to Germany's recent past. It united a broad range of individuals and insti-

missile deployment in West Germany reminded him of Goebbels's notorious Sportpalast speech of 1943 culminating in the phrase "do you want total war?"[25] But nobody went as far as the Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt who compared the "decision to arm both parts of our fatherland with atomic bombs" to the Enabling Law, thus implying that the Adenauer government was authorized to steer Germany toward another, a nuclear war.[26] It may have been evoked because the Bundestag debate coincided with the anniversary of the passing of the Enabling Law and, once again, the Social Democrats felt powerless facing imminent evil.[27] At some of the protest marches anti-nuclear campaigners carried banners with the slogan "first Bergen-Belsen, now Bergen-Hohne."[28] Bergen-Belsen, the concentration camp, and Bergen-Hohne, the nuclear missile range, were equated as symbols for mass murder. Interestingly, one historical reference point for nuclear extinction was a blend of recent German and ancient history. One of the slogans read: "Ancient Carthage led three wars: it was still mighty after the first, still inhabitable after the second, it had disappeared after the third."[29] And the following extract from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* is just one example of repeatedly expressed concerns that German politicians had not learnt their lessons of the past: "Some German politicians, showing that they have learnt nothing from recent German history, declare that the better armed we are, the higher our international standing will be."[30] The measures that were taken against the protesters reminded some commentators of the Nazi methods against political opponents and the undermining of the *Rechtsstaat* at the end of the Weimar Republic.[31]

Beatrice Heuser has argued that "German crimes of the past lie at the heart of the German attitude to the use of force, and thus nuclear weapons."[32] As shown above, this is certainly true, yet while there are clear connections between the argument for nuclear abstention and the legacy of the Nazi past, universal condemnation of nuclear weapons was at the core of the non-nuclear campaign. The basis of the anti-nuclear arguments was to some extent specifically German but the target was global. Few in the movement recognized a specific German responsibility for nuclear abstention resulting from the German past. The Göttingen Manifesto, a memorandum of eighteen German physicists opposing nuclear weapons, sought nuclear renunciation due to Germany's size and geography, and Protestant Church leader Martin Niemöller's sermon against

nuclear weapons was based on the conviction that no purpose justified the development and use of such horrific weapons anywhere.[33] The idea of a specific German responsibility to renounce nuclear weapons was not apparent in the GCND manifesto.[34] In fact, the Easter March slogans overwhelmingly referred to global disarmament and contemporary issues, for example, playgrounds and social security, instead of nuclear weapons.[35] In short, the protest was directed against all nuclear weapons anywhere.[36] The evocation of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and a profound sense of helplessness in the face of the nuclear arms race suggest that for many Germans nuclear weapons symbolized the return of the devastation of the past. Michael Geyer has argued that the "occupation of the present with the nightmares of the past is what Cold War angst was all about. Germans had experienced their end of the world and the only remaining question was whether there would be a thereafter."[37] It also reflected the German interpretation of themselves as (passive) victims in devastating wars past and future.

The British viewed the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany and plans for a NATO nuclear MRBM force with unease. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan reflected in a note to Foreign Secretary John Selwyn Lloyd: "I am quite sure that we are on good ground as regards what we have agreed so far in the arming of German troops with nuclear weapons so long as the key of the cupboard is in American hands." He continued: "But behind all this there is a feeling that the Germans pursue a rather ambivalent policy. Nobody knows for instance how many ex-Nazis are in fact employed either in the Army, Civil Service or Judiciary."[38] Lloyd regarded the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons as a first step toward loosening the 1954 accords. Soon the Germans might not accept US control over these weapons any longer.[39] Despite this, to avoid alienating Germany and disrupting NATO's defense policy, Lloyd came down against open opposition.[40] Yet, he was clearly worried about future developments. In 1960, discussing NATO nuclear sharing concepts, he noted: "In no circumstances should we agree to any plans which allow the Germans to have free access to nuclear warheads.... It is true that the present mood in Germany gives no reasonable cause for distrusting present German policies. But it is natural to have doubts about German reliability in the long run."[41]

The Labour opposition was much more outspoken. During a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons in February 1960, the Labour MPs Denis Healey and Alan Thompson contested fervently against nuclear weapons for Germany. Thompson spoke at length about repeated German aggression, the peculiarity of German nationalism, the lax persecution of war criminals and anti-Semitic incidents in Germany. All these points served as basis for his argument against German control over nuclear weapons.[42] However, the essence of Thompson's argument was not different from Lloyd's main point: apprehension about German reliability and future stability, or, as Thompson put it, "fear of the Fifth Reich."[43] These sentiments were echoed in British tabloids that reported the debate. Concern about Germany was reflected in numerous reports of the anti-Semitic incidents during the winter of 1959/60.[44] Labour advocated containment, Foreign Secretary Lloyd was clearly torn between containment and rehabilitation of Germany. He countered the Labour attack with the words: "I saw the liberation of Belsen but if we want to create a new Germany we have to treat her as equal without discrimination."[45] On the one hand there was the need to contain Germany for fear of future developments, on the other hand containment might lead to revival of nationalism and aggression. This quandary came to dominate British nuclear policy toward Germany.

Despite the initial success, by the early 1960s the West German anti-nuclear movement had lost most of its drive. A government campaign focusing on the Soviet threat and communist subversion of the West German peace movement had a powerful impact on the population.[46] The majority of Germans supported Western integration and felt safer in the lap of Adenauer and NATO than outside. In the general election of 1957 the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister-party, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), won an absolute majority for the first (and only) time in West German history. The diversity and disunity of the anti-nuclear campaign proved another factor in the decline of the movement. The Trade Union Federation and SPD, who had hoped to win the regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia in July 1958 on the anti-nuclear ticket, withdrew their support after a remarkable and unexpected defeat at the polls. This marked the end of the first nuclear debate in West Germany. All that remained was a hard core of activists participating in the annual Easter marches.

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While the short-term goal of the MLF was to prevent possible Franco-German nuclear collaboration under the 1963 Friendship Treaty,[50] a long-term fear of the Americans was that, without alleviation of their second-class status, the Germans would become disillusioned with NATO and explore the path of neutrality and unity. In short, the prospect of a resurgent, powerful Germany unconstrained by alliance commitments was a significant factor in the plan to grant the West Germans limited control over nuclear weapons. The ultimate worry was that a disgruntled Germany would seek a unilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union. Evoking the specters of Rapallo and the Hitler–Stalin pact, a State Department memorandum titled "Dangers from a Psychotic Germany" argued that a Germany isolated from the club of Western nuclear nations led by a feeling of discrimination might "embark on a romantic but destructive adventure with the East."[51]

Similar thoughts were echoed by British diplomats who argued that keeping West Germany in an inferior position might lead to a revival of nationalism.[52] The State Department also harbored concerns that, without the MLF, the control of moderate Germans in the government would be weakened.[53] However, it was the Germans themselves who had put forward this argument: Sir Frank Roberts, the British ambassador in Bonn, reported that "what the present leaders of Germany fear for internal as well as external political reasons, is the possibility that one day some demagogue

seems to have been accepted by the Western powers. The lines of thinking reveal implicit connections between post-Versailles Germany, Hitler's rise to power and the dangers of keeping postwar Germany in an inferior

So sleep well, my darling, the sandman can linger
We know our buddies won't give us the finger
Heil— hail—the Wehrmacht, I mean the Bundeswehr
Hail to our loyal ally
MLF will scare Brezhnev

Western recognition of the GDR before the Adenauer government grudgingly signed the agreement.[72]

German opposition to the Moscow Agreement revealed deep-rooted concerns about the German question and the nuclear option which were voiced in comparisons suggesting that, once again, the victors of World Wars I and II coerced Germany into accepting another “diktat.” Disgruntled German politicians and journalists compared the Test Ban Treaty to the Treaty of Versailles, others saw it as a return to Yalta.[73] Franz Josef Strauß linked the treaty to the Munich agreement and former Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano lamented “American appeasement” of communist dictatorship.[74] Germany was now cast in the role of the victim of American appeasement policy toward Moscow. West German nuclear abstention, a long-standing Soviet demand, was fixed in an international agreement with the Soviet Union. It destroyed illusions that the German past was bygones and that the FRG would soon be seen on equal rank with Britain and France. The treaty cemented West German nuclear inferiority, marking a decisive difference in international status. Those who had their illusions about West Germany’s international standing shattered by the Test Ban Treaty reverted to polemics of the “victors’ peace.” Protest about alleged “American appeasement” equally mirrored German reluctance to come to terms with German division. In 1963 the Western consensus of the 1950s that disarmament must include progress toward German unification was eventually sacrificed at the altar of détente with the Soviet Union. The Moscow Agreement implied American acceptance of the status quo in central Europe. In the Federal Republic, negating the existence of “the other Germany” was not just a political strategy; it also clouded painful postwar realities many in Bonn were unwilling to confront: the long-term division of Germany, the abandonment of seventeen million East Germans for the sake of Western integration and prosperity in the FRG, and the fruitlessness of the policy of strength. Growing distrust over American and British resolve to defend German interests nurtured the perception that the Moscow Agreement was forced onto the Federal Republic against her very interests: the German question and the nuclear option.

Neither the US nor the UK had any intention of recognizing the GDR explicitly or implicitly through the test-ban agreement. The Western position was clarified in a joint note to the Soviet Union emphasizing that

the East German signature of the treaty in Moscow would not be confirmed in London or Washington. This indicates that the uproar in Bonn was in equal measure about West German nuclear discrimination. Indeed, Harold Macmillan's letters to President Kennedy show that Macmillan's main interest in securing a test-ban agreement was to stop Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. Macmillan explained to Kennedy:

> My own impression has always been that Soviet fear and even hatred of Germany is one of the few genuine emotions which the Russian leaders permit themselves. Curiously enough this is one subject on which our interests coincide with that of the Russians. For bearing in mind the history of the last 50 years, no American or British Government could view with equanimity a Germany armed with nuclear capacity.

Macmillan went on to explain that given German history, all allies were anxious as to what might happen in some future Germany, especially if armed with nuclear weapons. He argued that if the Germans were now to voluntarily sign with many other states the test-ban agreement and a nondissemination agreement, they could do so without loss of face. Then, "a future Nationalist leader" could not present current restrictions on German armament imposed in 1954 as "another Versailles."[75] Ironically, Macmillan made this argument just before members of the German government publicly called the test-ban agreement another Versailles. Macmillan, like his former Foreign Secretary Lloyd, was not worried about present-day Germany but about long-term developments.

Macmillan saw the test-ban agreement as a first step toward German nuclear renunciation that should be followed by a nonproliferation agreement. In this position he was in complete agreement with Labour leader Harold Wilson who became British prime minister in 1964.[76] Consequently, the successful conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement remained a key foreign policy objective after the Labour Party came to power. While news of superpower agreement on a draft treaty in 1966 was welcomed in London, it produced a broad range of reactions in Bonn. Willy Brandt, the SPD foreign minister in the Grand Coalition government under Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, welcomed a nondissemination agreement provided that certain conditions were met, such as unrestrained

use of civil nuclear energy and a superpower obligation to disarmament.[77] Yet, the treaty had the potential of splitting the coalition as it caused outrage among the CSU and parts of the CDU. The NPT was described as "worse than the Morgenthau plan," "a Versailles of cosmic dimension" and "another Yalta."[78] These historical analogies show an attempt to draw a line from Versailles to the Morgenthau plan, the Yalta Conference and the signature of the Nonproliferation Treaty. German reactions reflected those to the Test Ban Treaty. Germans shouted "diktat!" claiming that there was a continuity from the Versailles Treaty to the NPT, a continuity in German history of Germany's unfairly harsh treatment by the Western powers. This time the Western powers had hatched a plot even worse than the Test Ban Treaty: the NPT would bar the Federal Republic from the most modern weapons. Its provisions ruled out national nuclear capabilities and concepts of nuclear *Mitsprache* for a duration of twenty-five years. Moreover, its opponents argued, the discriminative nature of the controls the NPT imposed on non-nuclear-weapon states would seriously impede the Federal Republic's technological advance in the field of civil nuclear technology. Consequently, the NPT would epitomize the final realization of Morgenthau's plans to turn Germany into a country of peasants and shepherds and therefore mean not only nuclear abstention and defenselessness but also economic punishment.

The nationalist rhetoric toned down after negative international responses. But it weakened the case of the very legitimate criticisms of the NPT the FRG shared with many other non-nuclear-weapon states. These centered on restrictions on the civil nuclear programs, security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states, the duration of the treaty (which was set longer than the NATO treaty) and the option of developing a European deterrent within a future United Europe.[79] The journalist Reinhard Appel emphasized the importance of a sober debate in an article called "The Treaty and National Issues." He pleaded for a constructive but critical approach toward the treaty focusing on the real issues of concern for West Germany and other non-nuclear-weapon states. He argued that the CDU should not pretend that West Germany could conduct world power politics while the SPD should not "try so hard to wear the hair shirt of the nation." Appel continued: "That for which we have to atone for affects us all; and of course we still have much to atone for, whether we like that or not." [80] He stated clearly that in the negotiations about nuclear renunciation

the Federal Republic was a special case due to her recent past and that this reality had to be accepted. Therefore, Bonn could not stand aside like France or India, but should join the debate with constructive criticism to achieve a fair treaty for the non-nuclear-weapon states.

A number of left-liberal journalists and newspapers opposed the outcry against another imagined "encirclement," pointing out that a country with "the moral burden of two world wars on its conscience" was ill-advised to lead international opposition against the treaty.[81] However,

Party.[88] Yet, Wilson left no doubt that his government wished Bonn's signature of the NPT.

Internationally, West Germany was in the limelight of the NPT negotiations and, while West Germany was listed alongside India, Pakistan and Israel as key threshold countries whose signatures would be crucial for the success of a global nonproliferation regime, it was clear that the German case was different. The *New York Times* stated, "if there is one government on earth that can not abstain from the treaty, it is the West German government."[89] The same idea was expressed more bluntly by Soviet Foreign Secretary Gromyko, who declared that West Germany had to sign the treaty whether Bonn liked it or not. Gromyko's remarks made during a visit in London were not disputed by his British hosts.[90] The marathon of bilateral negotiations between the US and West Germany also indicated that Germany was a special case.[91] So did Soviet claims—made during the NPT negotiations—on a right of intervention in Germany as sanctioned by Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter on the aggressive policy of enemy countries of World War II.[92] For the Soviets, German signature of the NPT constituted one of the most important elements of a peace treaty with Germany that, due to German division, had been postponed indefinitely. In the US State Department officials and military experts advanced the idea whether West Germany would not be the ideal country to lead countries to voluntarily sign the NPT and call for renunciation of nuclear weapons, thus regaining moral respect and international leverage.[93] Significantly, these ideas were not discussed in the Federal Republic. In the late 1960s enforced abstention from nuclear weapons signified a unilateral concession toward the Soviet Union and a stigma that still separated West Germany from Britain and France. The NPT, it seemed, was the ghost of Germany's past haunting the increasingly successful Republic so eager to declare "the end of the postwar era."[94]

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allies were concerned that in the long term restrictions which "smacked of Versailles or another diktat" might have serious consequences for the future development of the Federal Republic. Fears that West Germany would not accept nuclear inferiority forever, would break out of the alliance and seek a settlement with the Soviet Union, were always tangible. The MLF had been partly designed to counter another German *Sonderweg*. In the end these fears were not strong enough to give the idea of nuclear sharing sufficient weight. A non-nuclear Germany was "the ultimate touchstone" in reaching détente with the Soviet Union and stability in the Cold War system.[95] Détente, stability and prevention of global nuclear proliferation proved more important than German nuclear aspirations. Paradoxically, nuclear sharing was designed to address West German

To what extent was West German nuclear policy linked with the politics of the past? At first sight there were not too many blatant links. In fact, the links were more implicit but always tangible. A Foreign Ministry memorandum of 1968 highlights that international embarrassment proved a particularly significant concern. It argued that German non-signature of the NPT would have "a cumulative effect with other issues that currently damage West Germany's image abroad, like the increase of the NPD and the possible end of the statute of limitations for NS crimes."[97] International protest during the debate about the extension of the statute of limitations forced the Germans to reflect on public opinion abroad and its potential impact on allied nuclear policy. The NPD election success fueled concerns about the long-term stability of the Republic and raised the danger of international isolation. Trust in a real change of Germany was low and this was related to (alleged) quests for nuclear weapons and the politics of the past. The issue of Germany's nuclear status was still widely associated with aggression and militarization, not with a contribution to the collective defense of the Western alliance.

In the 1950s and 1960s much of the political right in Germany had portrayed nuclear policy as the continuation of Versailles and Yalta or as another Munich and appeasement. The Western allies were conscious of the perceived "lessons of the past" in their dealings with the Germans—and the Soviet Union.[98] In the discourse "Versailles" and "Munich" became "icons of *Geschichtspolitik*" applied universally and indiscriminately to this day.[99] For those in and outside of Germany opposed to nuclear weapons in German hands or on German soil historical analogies centered on German aggression and militarism. By the early 1980s references to the Holocaust dominated yet another debate over nuclear weapons in Germany. The NATO two-track decision of 1979 and the subsequent debate whether Germany should accept the deployment of US Pershing and cruise missiles in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe resulted in a revival of the West German peace movement and wide public protest against nuclear weapons. Anton-Andreas Guha, defense correspondent of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, described NATO's two-track decision as "Europe's Holocaust"[100]—notwithstanding that this decision and missile deployment were designed to enhance deterrence and thus make nuclear war less likely. The term "nuclear Holocaust" became widely used by the German peace movement and members of the

3. Assmann and Frevert call the second phase, lasting from 1958 to 1985, "Kritik der Vergangenheitsbewältigung" (*Geschichtsvergessenheit*, 144). The term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past), often used to describe German efforts to cope with or overcome the recent past, is problematic since it implies "to overcome and leave behind" and to cope with the past in a way that people "cope with workload or debt." Grunenberg, *Die Lust an der Schuld*, 57.

4. See Mark Cioc,

Command of Western Nuclear Forces 1945–64 (Amsterdam, 2000); David Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, DC, 1983).

14. Christian Tuschoff, *Die MC-70 und die Einführung nuklearer Trägersysteme in der Bundeswehr* (Ebenhausen, 1990); Detlef Bald, *Die Atombewaffnung der Bundeswehr* (Bremen, 1994).

15. To what extent the US maintained ultimate control has been questioned. See Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 194–96.

16. Michael Geyer, "Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons," in Hanna Schissler, ed. *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Princeton, 2001), 383–85.

17. Ibid., 382–83.

18. Cioc, *Pax Atomica*, 70.

19. The Protestant Church remained divided over nuclear weapons and never managed to agree on a unified position; see ibid., 112–15.

20. Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 35–37.

21. *Stuttgarter Zeitung,* 17 May 1958.

22. *Hamburger Echo*, 27 May 1958.

23. On this theme see also Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?* 192.

24. Eugen Gerstenmaier, quoted in Alexandra Rese, *Wirkung politischer Stellungnahmen von Wissenschaftlern am Beispiel der Göttinger Erklärung* (Frankfurt/Main, 1999), 141.

25. Ibid., 139–40.

26. Quoted in Heuser, "Historical Lessons," 222.

27. Rese, *Wirkung politischer Stellungnahmen*, 142.

28. Ostermärsche in der Bundesrepublik, 1961, Dokumentation und Photos, undated [1961], Militärarchiv Freiburg, BW2/20203 (This slogan is also discussed in Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?* 180–81.)

29. Ibid.

30. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 Feb. 1960.

31. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 15 May 1958.

32. Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?* 185.

33. Martin Niemöller, *Zur atomaren Rüstung* (Darmstadt, 1959), 30. For the Göttingen Manifesto see Elisabeth Kraus, *Von der Uranspaltung zur Göttinger Erklärung* (Würzburg, 2001), 187–245; Rese, *Wirkung politischer Stellungnahmen*, 45–94.

34. Cioc, *Pax Atomica*, 119.

35. Ostermärsche in der Bundesrepublik, 1961, Dokumentation und Photos, undated [1961], Militärarchiv Freiburg, BW2/20205.

36. Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 41.

37. Geyer, "Cold War Angst," 398.

38. Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way,* 1959–61 (London, 1972), 98.
39. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 3 Nov. 1958, Public Record Office,

57. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 396.

58. *Der Spiegel*, 16 Dec. 1964.

59. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 678, col. 1312, 29 May 1963. Zilliacus was the MP for Gorton (Manchester).

60. Konrad Adenauer quoted in Assmann and Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit*, 142.

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92. Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Duckwitz, 28 Aug. 1968, *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik des Bundesrepublik Deutschland* 1968, doc. 272, 1053–55. Articles 53 and 107 contain provisions for action against former enemy states in case of "a renewal of aggressive policy on part of any such state" (Art. 53).

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